The Remaking of the Ottoman Empire: New Turkey’s Nationalist Alliance and Expansionist Gamble

Around a decade ago, ‘zero problems with neighbors’ was the major doctrine that shaped the country’s multidimensional foreign policy. Today’s ‘new Turkey’ tends to solve its problems more aggressively; hunting the Kurds, ensuring its military presence in many countries, and invading and reclaiming territories that were once part of the Ottoman Empire. While Erdoğan’s ‘nationalist alliance’ claims that the awakening of the Turks has begun, the country risks being overwhelmed by its impending, adventurous, and unpredictable foreign policy which could lead to solitude and isolation.

For decades, Turkey’s foreign policy was shaped by the doctrine of their founder and first President Kemal Atatürk: ‘peace at home, peace in the world’. Since its foundation in 1923, the nation has prided itself on its neutrality in all circumstances, even during World War II. In the years that followed Turkey profiled itself as a rational mediator and made efforts to become a vital piece of pacifist projects such as NATO and the EU. Turkey has mostly avoided confrontation with its neighbors, staying under the wings of the United States, and waiting in the queue for the EU.

In its first couple of years in Government, the Justice and Development Party (‘AKP’) seemed faithful to this Kemalist peacekeeping project. Atatürk’s westernization ideals were advanced and fresh life was blown into relations with the EU. Turkey’s wish to join the Union had never been that intense and achievable before. In 2010, the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu, advocated his ‘zero problems with neighbors’ doctrine to assure the world that Turkey, as a pragmatic and sensible partner, would benefit from strong economic cooperation with the rest of the world. However, while Turkey was a rising star in the region, attracted foreign money, introduced democratic rights, and attempted to establish friendships with its neighbors, the first signs of their intentions to move towards a more prominent leadership role in the Middle East began cropping up. The country was quietly using soft power tactics to reposition itself as the heir of the Ottoman Empire.

Despite Turkey’s stated aim of ‘zero problems with the neighbors’, since 2010 it has suffered a series of diplomatic blows. Relations with Israel came to a screeching halt after a Turkish humanitarian fleet destined for Gaza was attacked by Israeli commandos. During the civil war in Syria, Turkey has positioned itself against the Assad-regime and backed militant Islamic groups, especially those fighting the Kurds of Rojava. In Egypt, Erdoğan’s AKP has sided with Mohammed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood in their coup d’état against Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Aiming to become dominant in the region, Turkey has made considerable enemies by interfering in the internal affairs of these countries, supporting Sunni factions and pro-Turkish militias. In Syria, Iraq, and Libya, Turkey has actively been deploying Turkish-made military equipment. Turkey, once having the aspirations of becoming the region’s quiet leader, has become a more muscular player in the Middle East.

In the meantime, the Erdoğan administration has taken concrete steps to redesign the country’s political system from scratch, which could have further implications for Turkish foreign policy. After splitting from the Gülen-movement and ending his temporary cooperation with the Kurds, Erdoğan formed an alliance with the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (‘MHP’).  The aftermath of the failed coup in 2016 presented the perfect opportunity to bring his vision of a strongman government into reality, supported by this nationalist alliance. In the post-coup period, the nationalists took advantage of the State of Emergency to deal with the remaining Kurdish ‘hazards’ in Turkish politics, Gülenists in the bureaucracy, and pro-NATO Kemalists within the Turkish army. With the help of the MHP, the necessary laws were easily passed by Parliament to implement Erdoğan’s one-man rule. In this new political world, conservative-nationalist actors such as Hulusi Akar and Süleyman Soylu have been given vital roles. Akar, the current Minister of National Defence, is the leading figure in Turkey’s military operations abroad. Soylu, the Minister of the Interior, is increasingly gaining popularity and is rumored to be an eventual successor to Erdoğan.

In the recent past, nationalists have taken impulsive decisions to flash Turkey’s muscles. The country’s campaigns against the Kurds, support for radical Islamic groups, and claims in Syria and Libya have angered many in the international community. On top of that, Turkey has taken advantage of events such as the refugee crisis and their use of arbitrary arrests (such as that of pastor Andrew Brunson) as a trump card against the EU and US as well as a sop to their nationalist base. A more recent convergence with Russia for the installment of the S400 defense system further damaged the nation’s reliability as both a NATO ally and a candidate for the EU. This last move is highly questionable since it is doubtful as to whether Turkey’s new ally, Russia, would be happy to see Turkey grow into a new Ottoman Empire given their historical differences and proximity.

That Turkey’s new ‘supreme leader’ continuously refers to the dates 2023, 2053, and 2071 is telling. These dates are, respectively, the centenary of Turkey’s foundation in 1923; the sexcentenary of the Fall of Constantinople in 1453; and the millenary of the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, a symbolic date of the beginning of the Turkification of Anatolia. By using such nationalist references, Erdoğan not only pleases his own supporters but also a section of Kemalists that would be happy to see Turkey made great again. The message being delivered to the nationalist factions of Turkey is that the awakening of the Turks has begun. On the other hand, actions such as the conversion of the Hagia Sophia and the Church of Chora (Kariye) into mosques, are attempts to consolidate his popularity among this nationalist majority, albeit a threatening message is being given to the world that ‘new Turkey’ should be respected and taken seriously. Unlike the first decade of the AKP administration, in this new era, Turkey’s military prowess, aggressive posturing towards the world, and the prospect of being recognized as a great power go hand-in-hand with Erdoğan’s popularity among nationalists. In ‘New Turkey’, as he calls it, Erdoğan increasingly needs Turkey’s international strength to prolong his popularity.

The Turkish Lake and Mediterranean Bottlenecks

Turkey’s claims to recently discovered gas reservoirs in the eastern Mediterranean and rising tension with Greece should be interpreted in this context. Erdoğan’s nationalist alliance with the MHP is in agreement with pro-expansionist secular Kemalists when it comes to ‘the regretful losses of the Ottoman Empire’ in the Mediterranean and Aegean waters before and during World War I. This is the glue that binds Turkey’s politically irreconcilable factions. Since the early days of the Ottoman Empire, there has been a consensus that the Mediterranean has always been a ‘Turkish lake’ and that in the final days of the empire, the Ottomans were forced to withdraw from the Dodecanese (Twelve Islands). In this vein, Erdoğan’s reference to 2023 and Turkey’s Blue Homeland project are linked. This proposal is based on the idea that the nation should reinstate control over both territories, asserting that the Treaty of Lausanne should have been signed on different terms. Recent discoveries of natural gas have only added to Turkish desires to expand in the region.

The most important bottleneck in the Eastern Mediterranean comes from Turkey’s territorial claims. The first issue is the unilateral declaration of independence by Northern Cyprus, which is considered Turkey’s satellite by the rest of the world. The UN, EU and European Court of Human Rights have all forcefully rejected this bid and Turkey remains the only State that recognizes Northern Cyprus. Territories around the northern shore are officially under the administration of the Republic of Cyprus, which Turkey refuses to recognize. Another ongoing territorial dispute with Greece concerns the Dodecanese islands, one of which (Kastellorizo) is just two kilometers away from Turkey’s southern shore and 570 kilometers from Athens.

However, the problem lies not in Turkey’s claims themselves but how the country enforces them. Turkey’s diplomatic relations have become ultra-dependent on the prosperity and functioning of Erdoğan’s administration. Erdoğan’s impulsive changing of decisions is tied to his domestic popularity, his nationalist campaigns, and his romanticized Ottomanist-expansionist ideals of Cyprus and the Greek islands. These changes of direction complicate matters and make the Project Blue Homeland quite problematic. Turkey is simultaneously attempting to dominate the region whilst failing to build alliances with key nations such as Israel, Egypt, and Greece. In the Mediterranean, the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) makes Libya the only country that Turkey enjoys good cooperation with. Becoming a regional player with no allies is a difficult balancing act, made more difficult by frosty relations with the EU and US.

Unlike from the first decade of Erdoğan’s rule, during which Turkey was peaceful and sought consensus, the country’s foreign policy now serves as a tool for the AKP-MHP’s populist propaganda. Erdoğan’s decisions make short shrift of the nation’s neutral position and diplomatic respectability. On top of that, an increasingly threatening language based on the romanization of Ottoman expansionist ideals (fetihçilik) determines the direction of Turkey’s constantly changing foreign policy, seriously damaging the nation’s standing in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. As a critical assessment of Ottoman history shows, territorial claims, hot-headed decisions, and rash gambles can have serious implications. It was the rise of nationalist ideology and the associated territorial claims that were the two important factors that hastened the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Both the treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne, that are being condemned by today’s nationalists, were the consequences of an adventurous gamble to reinstall the power and prestige of the empire.

An important consequence of Turkey’s adventurous policy changes is the flight of foreign capital and the economic damage sustained as a result. A worsening economy represents a serious threat to Erdoğan’s AKP and his own political prospects in the run-up to the 2023 General Elections. To counter this, he may need more populist tension to hold onto power and to maintain his appeal among the nationalist base. For this reason, Turkey will likely wholeheartedly stick to the Project Blue Homeland; partly for the gas reservoirs to make itself less dependent on foreign energy, but also because of the political need for Erdoğan’s success in Turkey’s international power games. As a result, Turkey’s diplomatic reliability and prestige become victims of this reckless, rash, and risky gamble, as its ambitions lead to more solitude and isolation.